December 5, 2025
A wise man once said that the preconditions for a stable and prosperous society are diversity, transparency and rule of law. China has a dynamic relationship with all three.
This week featured an extraordinary report saying that two organizations which have provided regular monthly statistics on housing sales numbers had been told to cease making their data public. The problem with withholding that kind of data from the market is that everyone of course assumes the worst. Which may well be justified.
The property market has been core and foundational to China’s economy for 30 years, but has been slumping now for several years with no end in sight, and the much-touted new economic forces are not going to replace it fully. The rows of empty apartment buildings are present in just about all second tier, third tier and below cities across the country. They can’t be sold. No one will buy them. Who were they even built for, is a question that springs to mind as they drift past the traveler.
So we can extrapolate that housing sales are down even more. But the capacity of the system of absorb this kind of downturn is truly remarkable. Except there is usually a moment when rubber hits the road even in such controlled circumstances as we have here.
A case in point is a piece of news today about an obscure bank, the Yanbian Rural Commercial Bank in Jilin province, which missed a scheduled Nov. 22 interest payment on a RMB 300 million ($42.4 million) 10-year bond issued in 2017. Neither the bank nor the underwriter of the bond, Donghai Securities, made any announcement about the failure to make the payment. A factor in the bank’s financial woes for sure is the state of the property market, but it’s again another transparency problem. Shareholders and depositors would no doubt be interested in the development. It was revealed or unearthed by the excellent Caixin news service.
Anyway, have a weekend full of clarity…
November 28, 2025
There was a seemingly unplanned call this week between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, and while increased communication is welcome, there is not much clarity over what exactly came of it. It seems now that, despite some claims to the contrary, the call was initiated by Washington under the guise of a nudge for China to continue to implement some of the policies and trade deals it recently agreed to in the talks in South Korea.
But the timing also aligns with a need to provide stability vis-a-vis Japan’s recent security comments related to Taiwan. On the Japan side, a tense relationship is not new and China has banned fish imports from the country, canceled flights on 12 routes in December and the Muji store in Shanghai’s Pudong Airport is currently closed. All tactics that we have seen before in some way or another. But the increased talk of the island is noteworthy, with Japan’s clearer stance, Taiwan’s leader announcing $40 billion extra in defence spending and the US earmarking more military resources for the island.
From what we know of the call, Trump seems to have gone as far as recognizing the issue is an important one for China but not much further. The optics for the call can be spun either way, Beijing wants to look like both the stabilizer in a region where Tokyo is suddenly loud, and also continue to show strength in its desire for a conclusion to the issue. Trumpian Washington, meanwhile, wants to…it’s not clear. But both sides got what they needed: a headline that says they’re doing what they need to do.
With that, our headline to you: Have a great weekend.
November 21, 2025
One of the key problems in China’s current economic situation has for years now been local government debt. The exact numbers are difficult to calculate, but the overall impression is that the scale is large, and even for a system which has complete control over everything, this is a problem. A new wrinkle in the game is CTICs—Culture and Tourism Investment Companies. They are growing in number, they are backed by local governments and they are creating a growing pile of new debt.
For decades, at least, and one could argue centuries, a key dynamic of Chinese governance has been the relationship between central government and local government financing with the local governments trying to get as much money as possible out of the Centre, and providing as little tax revenue back. In the past couple of decades a herd of Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) grew up across China, which have been used by officials to park debt off their government books, with predictable consequences—it all became messy. The LGFV problem, it seems, has to some extent been brought under control in the past couple of years with the Centre insisting on a cleanup and reduction in debt levels. But in line with the basis of the Chinese saying “upstairs sets up a policy, and downstairs sets up a work-around,” local governments have been setting up CTICs based on the post-COVID domestic tourism trend. The excellent news service Caixin points out that this is not going so well, and that the CTICs have been used by local governments “to sidestep strict borrowing limits.”
The danger is that the CTICs repeat the mistakes of the LGFVs, with funds often being diverted to local government use, undermining the companies’ supposed purpose and exposing them to the same debt pressures as LGFVs. Not all of them are loss-making but the number that are losing money is growing. Many tourism development projects can be very expensive—remaking ancient towns, building amusement parks etc.—and there is no certainty on how many people come visit.
This all speaks to the fact that in the end there are only two ways to deal with debt—it can be paid down, or it can be written off. But it can’t be resolved by creating more debt. And so the debt problem rolls on.
Have a great winter weekend.
November 14, 2025
There’s not much going on in China at the moment that we can comment on, but there is a sense that things are possibly moving in the United States. It appears the Epstein files are in the process of being released out into the public sphere, and one can only presume that’s going to have some kind of impact. It could be possibly, maybe, a beginning of a crumbling of the Trumpist/MAGA façade. The economy is also not in great shape there, and legal, social and systemic problems are present in various places, and there is a sense of perhaps an inflection point in the offing. Not to mention a raft of geopolitical issues and inconsistencies.
The difference, it seems to us, between the American Show, and China, is that the problem the United States has is that its system is facing a challenge, the challenge being Mr. T and his approach to governance. Which isn’t unprecedented. The problem in China, on the other hands, is not a challenge to the system, but the system itself, in that the problems China is facing come out of the system’s policies, decisions and approach. One could argue that the US system allows for self correction to a much greater extent, but on the other hand, the centralized and highly controlled nature of the China system allows for a shift in policy approach that is fast, efficient and almost instantaneous in implementation. The Covid situation being a perfect example.
So while China seems quiet, at least superficially and for this week, our eyes are on the US, and will be over the weekend ahead, which we hope for you will be pleasant…
November 7, 2025
China’s premier Li Qiang gave a speech at the opening of the China International Import Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai this week providing some clarity on GDP targets, and what it boils down to is that they have let themselves off the 5% hook. He predicted the economy’s size to be RMB 170 trillion by 2030, which implies an annual growth rate of roughly 4% from current levels. An official study guide on the 15th five-year plan (FYP) published this week also declared 4.17% to be annual GDP growth rate target to reach the 2035 number first chosen.
Putting questions about reported GDP growth numbers to one side, consistent 4% growth is still stunning for a major economy. For the US and other mature economies, 2% is considered very solid, and 3% as turbo-charged. Is 4% achievable? We, yet again, hit the transparency problem, and have to fall back on atmospherics, and the collective word on the street is not positive.
The word “drift,” in fact, seems to apply. People were looking to the 4th Plenum and the 15th FYP to be some kind of a defining moment in the narrative, but it doesn’t seem to have been so. The Chinese stock market is riding high, it is true, but the word from those who play it is that it can only be safely played based on insider trading info and assumptions on government policy. The connection to the real economy is tenuous.
On the other hand, regardless of what the direction is, consistency of policy is a benefit for major companies in terms of planning and investment, and China has it. Although there is often a disconnect between central policy direction and local government implementation which can result in waste—EV cars and AI being two recent examples. But the almost Voltairian view of China as the meritocratic/bureaucratic perfect system has its supporters.
And speaking of systems, the US had a mini-election day on Tuesday, which added some extra nuance to US politics. Our guess would be that the next year is going to be incredibly volatile over there in America with the Trumpists pushing hard to implement their agenda as they see opportunities shrinking, thereby increasing the likelihood of them going too far and alienating significant groups. There is a deep relevance of this to China, both in terms of the actual policies of the US system and also in how a system with transparency and flexibility handles problems.
Have a great weekend!