China Economic Review
Charting China’s changing economic terrain · Since 1990

The Big Meeting

October 31, 2025

For the first time in six years, Mr Xi and Mr Trump met up and Trump declared the score was 12 out of 10. The markets to some extent disagreed—Wall Street fell, although not solely on news of the meeting. So what really happened? In larger terms, not much. The fundamental positions, strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, remain as is, and both sides really only agreed to step back for a while and pretend to be sort of friends. There were concessions on rare earths and tariffs, both of which can conceivably be changed again any time. The Chinese side agreed to delay controls on rare earths exports for a year, which takes the pressure off the US and the West, and one assessment we saw is that with the reduction in various tariff percentages, the average tariff rate of Chinese goods entering America will now be 47% which is considered to be manageable.

Two strange elements in the talks—Trump said that the topic of Taiwan never came up, which seems bizarre. It’s always going to be the first pro forma item on the Beijing talking point list. And Nvidia’s role was unclear. China needs Nvidia chips to fuel its AI revolution, and the indications are that Nvidia’s boss Jensen is happy to sell. He says basically that they are only a heartbeat behind the US anyway, so what’s the difference. Which is a position in terms of Nvidia’s valuation that makes a lot of sense, but maybe not so much in terms of the great geopolitical game being played. After the meeting Mr Xi said China and Nvidia would continue discussions, which suggests backdooring the US government. What extraordinary times we are in.

Possibly the key element in the meeting’s conclusion is the Chinese concession on rare earths. The US and other Western players are ramping up efforts to reduce the reliance on China’s rare earths and a year’s respite would be useful in terms of getting mining and refining up to speed, at least to some extent.

But we are dealing here ultimately with a serious game between two strong players, neither of whom wishes to relent. Those strengths and weaknesses that both sides have are worth considering in depth. The US has a diverse and rules-based system, a huge economy with great depth and a web of real power and influence around the world, but the problem is that under Trump these advantages are crumbling. China meanwhile has the strength of a highly centralized and focused system, but is struggling from the fact that it lacks the deep advantages that come from diversity and a rule-based system.

The takeaway? The world is not in great shape. Have a great weekend.

Plenum comes…

October 24, 2025

China’s system for the past 75 years has been built around a series of party meetings organised in a five-year cycle, and this week saw the 4th Plenum, or annual meeting, of the Central Committee of the 20th Party Congress. This meeting is where the most powerful people in the country come together to discuss and decide on the key political, economic and social issues facing the country, and propose the plan for 2026-2030 (the 15th Five-Year Plan or FYP) which will be ratified next March. Setting the targets and direction for the economy through FYPs perhaps made sense during the 1930s in the Soviet Union and in the 1950s in China, but there is the question of how relevant such a centralised approach is to economic development in the 21st century, given the incredible volatility and the speed and unpredictability of change. On the other hand, it is also definitely true that it’s good to have an overall plan of where we want to go.

So we have the plan. We don’t have all the details yet, but from what we have seen based upon the announcements that have been made, the plan is pushing for the same things that have been talked about over the last couple of years and beyond—“high-quality” economic development, self-reliance on all key technologies and materials, a shift from basic to advanced manufacturing, and also improved welfare conditions for the people of China. The China system over the last decade and more has been stressing more and more strongly national security and central party control over economic development. But the overall sense of the economy is that it is not in good shape, apart from certain areas that involve massive government subsidies and investment, including batteries, AI, infrastructure and non-fossil fuel energy production.

As we have pointed out before, and many others too, there is something of a contradiction between security and control and economic growth. The contradiction is that to create grassroots enthusiasm would to some extent involve a devolution and dispersal of control to households, private enterprises and foreign investors. The announcement at the end of the 4th Plenum indicated both an awareness of the fundamental economic problems—“We must vigorously boost consumption”—and a parallel determination to not waiver on the fundamental line: “Uphold the Party’s overall leadership and … adhere to Marxism-Leninism … and fully implement Xi Jinping Thought.”

One interesting aspect is that the system has proposed a target for per capita GDP to grow to the level of a moderately developed country by 2035. That would mean that China’s per capita GDP would grow from around $14,000 today to around $35,000 in a decade which would probably require approximately 10% GDP growth year on year on year. But even according to the officially announced figures, China’s GDP is actually growing at around, but probably less than, 5% per year. So how would it get to the level of growth required to hit that target? What a good question.

Anyway, this is based on just a preliminary look at the information. More in due course. But meanwhile, blue skies and a warm weekend for all!

Thoughts on the 15th Five-Year Plan

October 17, 2025

The economy remains largely in a less than healthy state, the property market is facing another year at least of declines, exports are at some point going to start feeling the pain of the tariffs, and consumers just refuse to start spending like it’s 1999. There are two paths forward—one is to stress economic development, the other is to stress party control—and they are incompatible. Party control has been in the ascendancy for more than a decade, and with unemployment growing, and private companies under growing pressure, the argument is that at some point, there needs to be a revised approach. For more than a year now, the Center has been signalling that things will change, honestly they will, but the fundamental things that need to be done to make a change are nowhere in sight. The next opportunity for the Center to do something arrives next week—the 4th Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, which will include the release of the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP). Will they grab it?

The basic problem is that China’s political system is based, to a considerable extent, on state control of the economy, which stabilises the party’s position and also benefits the various elites. A thorough rebalancing toward consumption would reduce the power of state-owned firms, and diversify capital away from direct central control. Private enterprise, foreign investors and consumer need some sense of blue skies and unlimited horizons before they leap in to invest and consume, and they had that in the 1990s and after WTO in 2001, but they don’t now.

The WTO agreement was an effort to get China to compromise on this fundamental issue, and Beijing accepted many requirements, but never followed through on many of them, for the reason given above—it would tend to impact on the party’s position. And so here we are again. What we don’t know is just how bad the economic situation is, and how close we are to a brick wall, that is, an inflection point in the development process. What would be the implications of a continued unwinding of the property market, of a continued rise in youth unemployment, of a continued reluctance on the part of private enterprises, foreign investors and consumers to take an optimistic view on prospects? It is absolutely true that this system has the ability to manage such changes better than any other system in the world. Maybe it just slides slowly down towards a socialist moderately prosperous economy with fewer foreign links inside a more stable and controlled walled garden? Is that the plan, perhaps? The 15th FYP, itself an indication of the way they conceive the economy, will make interesting reading.

Have a great weekend!

AI Update

October 10, 2025

We’re moving towards AGI (artificial general intelligence—capable of learning applying knowledge) and then ASI (artificial super intelligence—smarter than the whole human race combined) beyond it. Nobody knows how long it’s going to take. Some people say two or three years to AGI, some people say 10. But it seems to us that this impending change in the history of the human race is consciously or unconsciously at the heart of a lot of the chaos and weirdness in the world today. The status quo will not stand, is the feeling. A key point is that the development of AGI is not being done in a collaborative way, with everyone working together. The Chinese are definitely building AGI on their own. The various players in Silicon Valley, Google, Microsoft and OpenAI and the others, meanwhile, are competing but on the other hand, we’re guessing there is some cross fertilization of the whole AI effort between these people—they all know each other. It’s first past the post, whoever gets there first will reap the whole reward.

The China process is interesting, because at the heart of it there appears to be a flaw which also affects economic development—determination on the part of the party to have full control, and that the AGI created in China has to meet that requirement. This would presumably have some impact on the nature of China AGI and its mental flexibility, if that’s the right phrase, compared to what they’re going to come up with in Silicon Valley/US. If you add in that, plus all of the various issues with regard to supplies of chips, then does this mean China will not be able to catch up and the AGI crown will go to the US? It’s impossible to take a clear view on how many chips are getting into China from the US, regardless of whatever controls there are, but the controls are getting tougher and tougher and while China is increasing its ability to produce cutting-edge chips, they’re still behind. But how far behind? NVIDIA’s Jensen Huang recently said that China is now only microseconds behind. But who knows if that is a cover for greater sales or the truth? Both China and the US are pouring huge amounts of money into AI, and the direction of AI related stocks on Wall Street are a good indicator of that. Is it a bubble or the beginning of the future?

Bottom line? It’s impossible to say for sure, but it looks as if the systemic constraints on AI development in China are going to play a very important role in terms of how this plays out.

Influence

September 26, 2025

The Lowy Institute is a think tank in Australia which does some good stuff on China. It just issued its Southeast Asia Influence Index, which now has China with an overall score of 65 out of 100, a one-point lead over its nearest rival, the United States, making it the “most influential power” in six of the region’s 11 countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. This is such an own-goal for the US, which brings to mind the spectacle of Trump telling the assembled representatives of the nations of the world this week at the UN that they are all going to hell.

The fickleness of the US under Mr T is driving this process, but that also works both ways—his sudden about-turn on Ukraine could lead to a breakthrough. We will see. But in terms of Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Global South, it is basically the absence of the West that has provided the opportunity for China to become such a prominent player, rather than any inbuilt good feelings or positive contributions.

The extremist approach of Trump 2.0, as exemplified by his UN speech, is risky for the US, and challenges people and countries to respond. The response, internationally, is that China’s influence grows. And domestically (in the US), we have this week seen an extraordinary example of the limits of Trumpist power in terms of late-night TV comedians. Jimmy Kimmel’s show was suspended due to pressure from Trump because he hates the jokes. He of course denied that and said Kimmel was cancelled because of poor ratings. But Kimmel’s return monologue on Tuesday had by Friday garnered an incredible 21 million views on YouTube.

This is a time of great change globally. But our view is to be wary of reaching conclusions too early. The transparency gap creates a huge possibility of miscalculation. The US is ridiculously transparent, too much information. China is ridiculously opaque, too little information.

Speaking of which, there are various rumors about possible changes coming up next month. We discount many of them. Our view is that the big guy is solidly in control and is heading eventually towards being elevated to the position of “party chairman,” a position held by Mao, then by Hua Guofeng, then abolished in 1982.

Have a great weekend.